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The Texas Supreme Court was quite active in 2021, issuing several oil and gas opinions; however, two were quite controversial,
drawing numerous amicus curie from industry groups, oil and gas attorneys, and academia. In Concho Resources, Inc. v Ellison, the court
held that a subsequently executed, inconsistent instrument, even without words of grant, may divest a record mineral title.1 And, in Broadway National Bank v. Yates Energy Corp., the court held that prior title
holders may divest a current record title holder of their title by executing a correction deed without the joinder of, or notice to, the present
record title holder.2

1. 627 S.W.3d 226, 237 (Tex. 2021).
2. 631 S.W.3d 16, 25–26 (Tex. 2021).
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I. CONCHO RESOURCES, INC. V. ELLISON: BOUNDARY STIPULATIONS
AND RATIFICATIONS IN CONTRADICTION OF DEED DESCRIPTIONS
In Concho Resources, Inc. v. Ellison, the Texas Supreme Court
chose to uphold contractual agreements that stipulated the amount and
location of acreage as differing from the deed descriptions.3 The dispute in this case involved a 640-acre tract of land—Section 1—that
was owned by one family in the early 1900s.4
The family conveyed part of the land (the “Northwest Tract”) in
1927 and the rest (the “Southeast Tract”) in 1930.5 The 1927 deed described “[a]ll of [Section 1] lands located North and West of the public
road which now runs across the corner of said Survey, containing 147
acres, more or less.”6 However, the actual acreage of the portion northwest of the road was 301 acres.7 The 1930 deed described the land
conveyed as “493 acres” from Section 1.8 However, if the 1927 deed
conveyed all of the land northwest of the road—301 acres—then there
were only 339 acres left for the family to convey from Section 1.9
In 1987, the mineral owners of the Northwest Tract executed the
“Pilon Leases” that described a “147 acre tract of land out of [Section
1], lying N and W of the public road . . . and being the same land conveyed [by the 1927 deed].”10 By 1996, “the Pilon Leases were assigned to Jamie Ellison d/b/a Ellison Operating.”11
By 2006, the Sugg and Farmar families owned the Southwest
Tract mineral estate and granted an oil and gas lease to Samson Resources Company covering “‘493 [acres]’ in the ‘South part of [Section 1].’”12 However, in 2006, Samson obtained a drilling title opinion
showing the discrepancies listed above relating to the Southeast
Tract.13 Samson procured a survey plat showing the Southeast Tract
as being 493 acres and included 154 acres north of the road.14 This
would inferentially dictate that the Northwest Tract was 147 acres (as

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Concho Res., Inc, 627 S.W.3d at 237.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 228–29.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id.
See id. at 228–29.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 229–30.
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described in its 1927 deed) but that it did not include all of the land
north and west of the bridge (as described in the 1927 deed).15
In 2008, Samson initiated a contractual agreement—the Boundary Stipulation—to settle the question raised by the deed discrepancies.16 The Stipulation purported to be effective as of the 1987 date of
the execution of the Pilon Leases.17 It agreed with the stated acreage
on the 1927 and 1930 deeds but stipulated that 154 acres north and
west of the public road were part of the Southwest Tract.18 In other
words, per the Boundary Stipulation, the Northwest Tract did not include “all of [Section 1] lands located North and West of the public
road” as the 1927 deed had described.19 Samson obtained the signatures of the then-current mineral owners of the Southeast Tract and the
Northwest Tract and recorded the Boundary Stipulation in the property records.20 Samson also sent a letter to Jamie Ellison, the leaseholder of the Northwest Tract, in which Samson enclosed the Boundary Stipulation and asked Ellison to “signify your acceptance of the
description” by co-signing the letter, which Ellison did.21
However, in 2011, Jamie Ellison passed away, and his wife, Marsha Ellison, took over his lease on the Northwest Tract.22 She promptly
filed (among other claims) a trespass to try title suit against Samson
and other defendants, claiming that the Pilon Leases included all of
the land northwest of the road and that the 2008 Boundary Stipulation
had no impact on the leases.23
The trial court held that the Boundary Stipulation was valid and
that Ellison’s signature on the letter ratified the Stipulation’s boundary
line.24 The appeals court reversed, holding that the Boundary Stipulation was an attempted correction deed that was invalid because there
was no ambiguity or error to correct.25
The Texas Supreme Court granted petition for review and generally agreed with the trial court, upholding the Boundary Stipulation
and finding that Jamie Ellison ratified the Stipulation by co-signing
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See id. at 228–30.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 228–30.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 231–32.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 232–34.
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the letter from Samson.26 When a question arises about a boundary
location, parties have a choice: they can go to court for a judicial determination of the boundary,27 or they can resolve the question informally by executing a stipulation.28 Such a stipulation will be valid
even if the parties later discover that the contractual resolution was
erroneous.29 The Court saw “no reason to second-guess the owners’
decision to bind themselves in that manner without resorting to litigation.”30 Thus, the boundary stipulation was “enforceable between the
parties according to its terms.”31
The Court agreed that the Boundary Stipulation “could not by itself bind others who had an interest in the tracts and were not parties
to the agreement.”32 However, here, Jamie Ellison was not legally required to sign the ratification letter.33 There was no evidence that Samson coerced or fraudulently induced him to sign.34 Rather, he voluntarily signed; this “confirm[ed] his acceptance of the boundary line
agreed to in the stipulation as the leasehold boundary.”35 Even though
the letter from Samson’s landman stated that he would send a subsequent “more formal and recordable document” and never did so, Ellison’s signing of the letter was sufficient because the letter asked Ellison to “signify your acceptance of the description . . . by countersigning the letter.”36 Thus, the Court held the lease assignee Ellison to
the benefit of the bargain signed by her predecessor-in-interest.
In doing so, as many amici curiae pointed out, the decision is essentially allowing unrecorded instruments to not only operate as an
estoppel to a direct party but also apparently alter the record title and
the recorded deed descriptions.
II. BROADWAY NATIONAL BANK: RE-THINKING REQUIRED SIGNORS FOR
CORRECTION DEEDS
In Broadway National Bank, the Texas Supreme Court held that
Texas Property Code section 5.029 authorizes the original parties to a
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 228, 234.
See id. at 235.
See id.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 236.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 237.
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conveyance to correct a material error in a deed without requiring joinder of others who subsequently acquire interest in the property.37 This
case involves a trustee who executed a deed conveying the incorrect
mineral interest to a beneficiary and then attempted to fix the mistake
with correction deeds.38
After the settlor’s death, the bank (as a trustee) executed a deed
granting the settlor’s son, John, a 25% mineral interest in fee simple.39
The bank asserted that this was a mistake and filed a corrected deed in
2006, signed by only the bank, changing the fee simple grant to a life
estate.40 The bank sent copies of the correction deed to Yates, the lessee.41
Meanwhile, John granted his royalty interest to Yates, who acquired a title opinion expressing doubt as to the validity of the correction deed.42 The bank responded by recording an Amended Correction
Deed signed by all of the parties to the original mineral deed and stated
that the corrected deed entitled John to only a life estate.43 Shortly after, John died.44
A legal dispute ensued.45 The bank believed that John conveyed
to Yates only a life estate interest due to the amended deed.46 Yates
argued that John acquired full ownership under the original mineral
deed and conveyed that full ownership to Yates and that the Amended
Correction Deed did not affect Yates’s title.47
The probate court agreed with the bank and declared that the
Amended Correction Deed was valid, that it replaced the original mineral deed, and that Yates was not a bona fide purchaser because the
initial correction deed provided notice.48 But the court of appeals
agreed with Yates, holding that “it is not the agreement of the original
parties to the mistake that controls who must sign, but rather who controls the property at the time of the proposed correction.”49 Yates was
37.
2021).
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Yates Energy Corp., 631 S.W.3d 16, 29–30 (Tex.
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22–23.
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an assignee but did not sign the correction deed; therefore, it was invalid.50
Texas Property Code section 5.029 provides for a recorded correction instrument to correct a material error in a recorded instrument
of conveyance.51 Such an instrument must be:
(1) executed by each party to the recorded original instrument of conveyance the correction instrument is executed to
correct or, if applicable, a party’s heirs, successors, or assigns; and
(2) recorded in each county in which the original instrument
of conveyance that is being corrected is recorded.52
This case’s dispute centers on when a party’s heirs, successors, or
assigns are “applicable,” “such that their signatures are necessary to
validate a material correction under the statute.”53 The bank argued
that the language “if applicable” allowed an heir, successor, or assign
to sign in case the original party was unavailable.54 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that “if applicable” was a conditional clause
requiring any existing heir, successor, or assign to sign the correction
instrument; or, if none exist, then the original parties must sign the
document.55
The Texas Supreme Court stated that this is a matter of statutory
construction, requiring the court to seek meaning from the statute as a
whole, presume a purpose in each word, and use plain meaning unless
it leads to absurd results.56 Under these principles, the term “if applicable” in the statute “conditionally introduces the phrase ‘heirs, successors, or assigns,’ signaling that the phrase is meant to apply when
relevant or appropriate.”57 The statutory scheme provides a protection
for bona fide purchasers; this protection “would be pointless” if bona
fide purchasers “were otherwise required to sign a correction instrument for it to take effect.”58
Thus, the statute permits an original party’s heirs, successors, or
assigns to sign a correction instrument but does not require that they
do so.59 A correction deed is valid when executed by all of the original
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 20, 22.
TEX PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.029(b); Broadway, 631 S.W.3d at 22.
PROP. § 5.029(b).
Broadway, 631 S.W.3d at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23, 25.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 29–30.
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parties—regardless of whether they still own the relevant property interest.60 The validly “executed correction instrument replaces and is a
substitute for the original instrument, but the correction may not affect
the property interest of a bona fide purchaser.”61
However, four justices dissented and stated that the plain language of the statute combined with canons of statutory construction
require that assignees, if any exist, must sign the correction deed.62
The dissenting justices expressed concern that the majority opinion is
“contrary to the Texas Title Examination Standards” and that it will
“destabilize our record title system.”63 Numerous amicus pointed out
the problems this holding created for various parties beyond the title
holders, such as title insurance companies insuring title and lenders
lending money based on liens being valid.64 Further troubling is that
by this ruling, not the least of which the apparent duty now for a record
title holder to constantly review the public records to see if prior owners have filed a “correction” instrument that may have the effect of
divesting title and triggering the commencement of limitations on
challenging the instrument. It is the Author’s opinion that a more reasoned approach is that the statute’s reference to “ . . . if applicable, a
party’s heirs, successors, or assigns”65 means that if there is a subsequent purchaser, that party must join in the correction instrument.
III. BPX OPERATING: CLAUSES REQUIRING EXPRESS WRITTEN
CONSENT FOR POOLING CAN STAVE OFF IMPLIED RATIFICATION
ARGUMENTS
In BPX Operating Co. v. Strickhausen, the Texas Supreme Court
held that implied ratification of pooling depends on objective manifestations of intent and is not, as a matter of law, accomplished through
acceptance and deposit of checks.66 This case also serves as yet another reminder of how strongly Texas jurisprudence upholds parties’
freedom to contract.
Strickhausen, a mineral interest owner, executed a lease with
BPX including a provision that “pooling for oil or gas is expressly
denied and shall not be allowed under any circumstances without
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.029(b).
629 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Tex. 2021).
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[lessor’s] express written consent.”67 Disregarding this provision,
BPX pooled the property and drilled a well that ran horizontally under
Strickhausen’s property.68 Subsequently, BPX sent a letter to Strickhausen, asking her to sign a pooling consent agreement.69 Strickhausen’s attorney responded, asking for more information.70
The attorney and BPX exchanged emails on the issue, with BPX
asking Strickhausen’s attorney to “let us know what [the lessor] decides to do.”71 The attorney pointed out that the lessee had already
violated the lease by pooling without Strickhausen’s express, written
consent and clearly stated that Strickhausen “would not ratify the pooling . . . until a favorable settlement could be reached.”72 BPX
acknowledged this.73
Without reaching a conclusion, BPX filed a certificate of pooling
with the Railroad Commission and sent Strickhausen a royalty check
that notated the pooled unit.74 Less than a month later, Strickhausen’s
attorney rejected BPX’s “offer to settle the issue of the wrongful pooling” and made a counteroffer.75 BPX did not respond but continued to
send checks with the pooled unit notation, and Strickhausen deposited
the checks.76
Strickhausen sued BPX for breach of contract.77 The trial court
held that Strickhausen “ratified [BPX’s] breach by accepting, and negotiating, royalty checks from the pooled units,” regardless of whether
it was her intention to ratify.78 However, the court of appeals reversed,
holding that evidence did not conclusively establish intent to ratify because of Strickhausen’s ongoing challenges to the pooling.79
The Texas Supreme Court accepted the appeal, and its ensuing
opinion heavily discusses freedom to contract in the context of ratification and waiver. Courts must “look to objective evidence of intent,
such as the party’s conduct,” as “a party’s subjective state of mind is

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 193.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 193–94.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 195.
Id.
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immaterial to a claim of implied ratification.”80 This requires a court
to examine the totality of the circumstances.81
The Court distinguished the present case from Hooks, where it
held that the lessors’ acceptance of royalties impliedly ratified pooling
as a matter of law.82 There, the Court said all the facts pointed to intent
to ratify because the lessors accepted payments without challenging
the pool.83 But Strickhausen did object, presenting a set of facts that
did not uniformly show intent to ratify.84 Thus, Strickhausen’s actions
did not clearly establish intent to ratify as a matter of law.85 The Court
remanded for further proceedings.86
In analyzing Strickhausen’s objective intent, the Court emphasized the terms of the lease, which did not “just prohibit pooling” but
took “the additional step of dictating the only circumstance under
which pooling can ever be authorized: with Strickhausen’s ‘express
written consent.’”87 The Court stated that “the clause exists precisely
to stave off arguments like implied ratification.”88 Thus, lessors who
want to maintain strict control over pooling consent should add similar
clauses to leases or other mineral title instruments. Lessees should be
wary of relying on an implied ratification argument when similar
clauses exist in their leases.
IV. SAN AUGUSTINE CITY APPRAISAL DISTRICT V. CHAMBERS: NO
TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION OF MINERAL INTERESTS
WITHIN TAXING DISTRICT
In San Augustine County Appraisal District v. Chambers, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that lessors’ signing of division orders did
not affect or ratify any cross-conveyance giving rise to any taxable
interests in San Augustine County.89 The Chambers family entered
into oil and gas leases on their 652 acres in Shelby County.90 The
leases unitized their mineral interests with other land in San Augustine
80. Id. at 197.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 198; see also Hooks v. Samson Lone Star, Ltd. P’ship, 457 S.W.3d 52,
66 (Tex. 2015).
83. BPX Operating, 629 S.W.3d at 199; see also Hooks, 457 S.W.3d at 66.
84. BPX Operating, 629 S.W.3d at 200.
85. Id. at 200, 204.
86. Id. at 204.
87. Id. at 203.
88. Id.
89. 618 S.W.3d 398, 400 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2021, pet. denied).
90. Id.
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County.91 San Augustine County attempted to collect ad valorem tax
on the Chambers’ mineral interests, even though those interests were
located entirely within Shelby County.92
The Chambers protested, but the appraisal review board did not
accept their arguments.93 Next, the Chambers sought judicial review.94
However, the trial court granted summary judgment for the San Augustine County Appraisal District (“SCAD”), presumably accepting
the county’s arguments that the Chambers had cross-conveyed their
mineral interests with other mineral owners and were thus subject to
taxation in San Augustine County.95
However, on review, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that, because the leases expressly prohibited cross-conveyance of interests,
SCAD had failed to establish that the Chambers “own[ed] an interest
in pooled minerals located in San Augustine County or had an obligation to pay taxes in that county.”96 The court reversed and remanded.
On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment for the Chambers that, due to the leases’ prohibition on cross-conveyance, SCAD
lacked authority to assess ad valorem taxes on the Chambers’ mineral
interests.97 SCAD appealed, and the case went back to the Tyler Court
of Appeals.98
In this appeal, SCAD argued that,
by signing division orders that acknowledge their interests
and ownership within the units and accepting royalty payments pursuant to the division orders, Appellees waived their
right to protest the cross-conveyance language in their leases,
ratified the unit designations, and agreed to combine and
share in the production from the units, effecting a cross-conveyance . . . .99
The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.100 It appeared that
SCAD relied heavily on the fact that cross-conveyance clauses are
normal within pooling agreements and glossed over the fact that the
Chambers’ lease prohibited cross-conveyance of interests while still

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. at 400–01.
Id. at 400.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 400–01.
Id.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 404.
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providing for pooling.101 As the court explained, the Texas statute does
not authorize taxation of minerals outside the boundaries of the taxing
unit merely because they are pooled with a certain production unit.102
Neither does the Texas statute provide that pooling results in crossconveyance.103 Thus, “SCAD is required to apply the law.”104
The court also clapped back at SCAD’s argument that the Chambers had somehow ratified a cross-conveyance by signing division orders.105 The court agreed that signing division orders and accepting
payment can ratify a unitization.106 But “unitization, in the absence of
cross-conveyance, does not entitle SCAD to assess taxes on [the
Chambers] interests in the pooled units.”107 Moreover, “whether there
is a cross-conveyance depends on the lease language, not the presence
of unitization.”108
Ultimately, cross-conveyance did not occur because of the lease
provisions prohibiting cross-conveyance,109 nor did any factual circumstance accomplish a cross-conveyance.110 Thus, San Augustine
County failed to show valid authority to tax the Chambers’ mineral
interests.111
V. HOFFMAN V. THOMSON: THE FLOATING HORRORS OF DOUBLE
FRACTIONS
In Hoffman v. Thomson, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that a conveyance reserving an “undivided 3/32nd interest” had actually reserved a floating nonparticipating royalty interest (“NPRI”).112
The deed in question conveyed surface and mineral estates but then
“expressly reserved and retained unto the grantor . . . an undivided
three thirty-second’s (3/32nd’s) interest (same being three-fourths
(3/4’s) of the usual one-eighth (1/8th) royalty) in and to all of the oil,
gas and other minerals . . . .”113 The deed later referred twice to the
3/32 fraction, stating that in the event of production, the grantor “shall
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id. at 400–04.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 402–03.
Id. at 403.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 401–04.
Id. at 404.
630 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, pet. filed).
Id. at 431.
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receive a full three thirty-second’s (3/32nd’s) portion thereof as his
own property” and again that the grantor “shall own and be entitled to
receive three thirty-second’s (3/32nd’s) of the gross production of all
oil, gas and other minerals produced and saved . . . .”114
The parties disputed whether the deed reserved a fixed NPRI (a
fixed fraction of total production) or a floating NPRI (a fraction of the
total royalty interest that would vary depending on the royalty percentage the mineral estate owner negotiated).115 The district court determined that the deed reserved a fixed 3/32nd NPRI.116 But the court of
appeals disagreed.117
On appeal, the court focused on the “four corners” rule and used
a “holistic approach” to “harmonize all parts.”118 In multiple provisions, the deed named a term and then defined it; this structure was
important to the court.119 Additionally, the document was constructed
at a time when 1/8th was the normal royalty in a lease.120
Based on these factors, the court found that construing the lease
as conveying a fixed 3/32nd royalty would render the double fraction
meaningless, and that the only way to harmonize all the clauses and
give effect to each of them was to read the conveyance as reserving a
floating (variable) royalty.121 Based on this analysis, the Court construed “3/32nd” as a defined term, defined by the lease as “3/4 of the
royalty interest,” or 3/4th of whatever royalty interest happened to be
reserved in a future lease.122 Every subsequent mention of 3/32nd did
not literally mean 3/32nd but instead meant the 3/4th of the royalty.123
Thus, the deed reserved a floating NPRI.124 A petition for review is
pending in this case.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at 430–31.
Id. at 429.
Id.
Id. at 430, 433.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 431–32.
Id. at 435–36.
Id. at 436.
Id.
Id.
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VI. MRC PERMIAN COMPANY V. POINT ENERGY PARTNERS PERMIAN
LLC: THE BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN IN THE BROADEST OF FORCE
MAJEURE CLAUSES
In MRC Permian Company v. Point Energy Partners Permian
LLC, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held parties to the benefit of
the bargain of their extremely broad force majeure clause and refused
to imply conditions or narrow its scope.125 MRC (the lessee) executed
a lease with a force majeure clause providing that MRC could extend
any continuous drilling deadline in the event of a “non-economic event
beyond Lessee’s control” that delayed its operations.126 The primary
term expired, and the lease required MRC to begin drilling another
well before May 21, 2017 to avoid forfeiture.127 MRC originally
scheduled drilling to begin on May 11, but, due to an administrative
error, MRC delayed the drilling until June.128 However, in April, the
rig that MRC needed to use to drill the well was damaged while drilling on another site, resulting in a 30-hour delay.129
MRC asserted that this was a force-majeure event capable of extending the continuous drilling deadline and gave the lessor timely notice of the event.130 The lessor disputed that the force majeure clause
applied.131 MRC sought a declaratory judgment on the issue, which
the trial court denied, and MRC subsequently appealed.132 Although
the parties raised other issues, this summary focuses on the force
majeure clause analysis on appeal.
The lessee argued that this situation could not constitute a forcemajeure event because it was an off-lease condition (the rig broke
down on another drilling site) and because it was not a substantial factor in the lessee’s failure to meet the deadline.133 But the court found
that the lease did not require an on-lease condition, and it did not require the triggering event to be a substantial factor or a direct link in
the delay.134 The lease merely required that MRC’s drilling be “delayed by a non-economic event beyond its control.”135
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

624 S.W.3d 643, 660 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. filed).
Id. at 652, 657.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 654–55.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 659–60.
Id. at 660.
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The court applied ordinary principles of contract instruction and
declined to “impose a more stringent obligation unless it is clear that
the parties intended to do so.”136 Thus, an on-lease condition that was
not a substantial factor could be a triggering event.137 However, due to
issues of fact including whether the rig breakdown had any causal connection to the delay, the court remanded.138 A petition for review is
pending in this case.
VII. REGENCY FIELD SERVICES, LLC V. SWIFT ENERGY OPERATING,
LLC: TIMING MATTERS ON PLEADING INJURY
In Regency, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether lessee’s claims of underground trespass, negligence, gross negligence,
and nuisance accrued more than two years before the lessee discovered
them, barring the claims by limitations.139 Regency’s disposal injection well leaked hydrogen sulfide underground onto an adjacent tract
and contaminated some wells.140 A nearby lessee, Swift, discovered in
October 2012 that the hydrogen sulfite necessarily had to migrate
through mineral estate covered under Swift’s leases.141 A study
showed that the hydrogen sulfide may have leaked as early as April
2009.142 In 2015, Swift intervened in a lawsuit and Regency moved
for summary judgment based on limitations—a motion which the trial
court granted and the appeals court partly reversed.143
The Supreme Court granted petition for review and determined
that fact issues as to whether Swift had even suffered a legal injury
precluded summary judgment.144 Swift’s pleadings alleged future
damages and general injury but failed to allege that the injectate plume
had already reached or damaged Swift’s existing wells or specific
planned drill sites.145 The Court was unable to determine whether Regency’s leakage had already interfered with Swift’s use and enjoyment
of property or invaded or interfered with his rights to explore and

136. Id. at 656.
137. Id. at 662–63.
138. Id.
139. Regency Field Servs., LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d
807, 813–14 (Tex. 2021).
140. Id. at 812–13.
141. Id. at 813.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 824.
145. Id. at 822.
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produce, much less to determine when that happened.146 Thus, the
Court reversed summary judgment and remanded the case.147
VIII. YOWELL V. GRANITE OPERATING CO.: REFORMATION TO AVOID
VIOLATING THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
In the most recent iteration of Yowell, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered on remand from the Supreme Court whether a top
lease interest could be reformed to comply with the rule against perpetuities.148 This dispute involved a lease provision that stated that if
the lease terminated and the lessee obtained new leases covering or
affecting all or part of the same mineral interest, “the overriding royalty interest reserved herein shall attach” to the new leases and that
any subsequent new leases “shall contain a provision whereby such
overriding royalty shall apply and attach to any subsequent extensions
or renewal of Subject Leases.”149 This created a property interest under the subsequent new lease, but the interest did not vest at the time
of creation and violated the rule against perpetuities.150 The court
agreed that the lease could be reformed under Tex. Prop. Code section
5.043(a) to “limit the period in which it might vest to no longer than
twenty-one years after the death of any natural person whose life was
in being at the time the overriding royalty interest was created.”151 A
petition for review is pending in this case.
IX. POSSE ENERGY, LTD. V. PARSLEY ENERGY, LP: “ALL” DOES NOT
MEAN “ALL” WHEN THE PARTIES SAY IT DOES NOT
In Posse Energy, Ltd. v. Parsley Energy, LP, the El Paso Court of
Appeals considered whether a set of documents conveyed mineral
rights to all depths or only to shallow depths.152 The acquisition agreement and assignment indicated they were to be harmonized with other
expressly named agreements and deeds.153 The court refused to use the
corresponding documents to alter the plain meaning of the
146. Id. at 821.
147. Id. at 824.
148. Yowell v. Granite Operating Co., 630 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. filed).
149. Id. at 570.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 571.
152. Posse Energy, Ltd. v. Parsley Energy, LP, 632 S.W.3d 677, 685–86 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2021, pet. filed).
153. Id. at 691.
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agreement.154 The acquisition agreement and assignment expressly set
the conveyance as “all” property described in the exhibits.155 The exhibits describing the disputed areas limit the broad grant by stating
“insofar and only insofar as the lease covers the proration units” for
named wells.156 Proration units did not reach below 8,900 feet. So,
harmonizing the documents, the court found that the parties’ intent
was to convey only rights down to 8,900 feet, not below.157 A petition
for review is pending in this case.
X. FOOTE V. TEXCEL EXPLORATION, INC.: CATTLE ARE NOT
LICENSEES—THE CASE OF THE INCORRECT CAUSE OF ACTION
In Foote v. Texcel Exploration, Inc., Texcel operated a well on
land where the surface was subleased to a cattle rancher who used it
to pasture over 650 head of cattle.158 The cattle had a habit of getting
into the well operations area, and one day the cattle broke a pipe,
caused a spill, and ingested oil.159 Many cattle became ill, and 132
head died.160 The cattle owner and manager sued Texcel on theories
of premises liability and negligent undertaking, alleging that the lessee
negligently failed to build a fence and that the cattle were licensees.161
The jury found that the cattle were not “licensees” on the property.162
On appeal, the cattle rancher argued that the trial court erred by
not finding as a matter of law that the cattle were invitees.163 But the
Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, adding
that premises liability was the incorrect cause of action.164 The court
stated that the cattle rancher had ignored the two potentially viable
causes of action.165
154. Id. at 691–92.
155. Id. at 692–93, 696.
156. Id. at 695.
157. Id.
158. Foote v. Texcel Expl., Inc., No. 11-20-00028-CV, 2022 WL 175824, at *1–
2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 20, 2022, no pet. h.).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *1, *3.
162. Id. at *3.
163. Id. at *4.
164. Id. at *3, *10.
165. Id. at *3 (quoting Satanta Oil Co. v. Henderson, 855 S.W.2d 888, 889–90
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, no writ) (“[T]he owner/lessee of the surface estate in
order to recover against the mineral lessee or operator for injury to his cattle must
plead, prove and obtain a jury finding on one of the following: [1] That the lessee/operator intentionally, willfully or wantonly injured the cattle; or [2] That the lessee/operator used more land than was reasonably necessary for carrying out the
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XI. BLUESTONE AND POSTPRODUCTION COSTS: CALCULATING
ROYALTIES “AT THE MOUTH” AND “IN THE PIPELINE”
In BlueStone Natural Resources II, LLC v. Randle,166 the Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the Fort Worth Court of Appeals holding that
the lessee could not deduct post-production costs from the lessor’s
royalty when the contract contained conflicting provisions.167 The royalty clause in the printed lease instructed the parties to base the royalty
on “the market value at the well” with the amount “computed at the
mouth of the well.”168 This language indicates that the lessee may deduct post-production costs.169 However, an addendum to the lease
stated, to the contrary, that the “[l]essee agrees to compute and pay
royalties on the gross value received,” negating the lessee’s ability to
deduct post-production costs.170
At first glance, the court’s holding here may appear to contradict
Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. LP v. Texas Crude Energy, LLC,
in which the Texas Supreme Court found that the “mouth of the well”
language controlled in a similar conflict of terms regarding postproduction costs.171 However, here—unlike in Burlington—the parties
had anticipated potential conflict and addressed it by providing that
the addendum would supersede any contradictory provisions in the
printed lease.172 Thus, the court held that BlueStone had wrongfully
deducted postproduction costs.173 This holding confirms that Burlington does not override parties’ contractual freedom to agree on a different result than the court would otherwise reach. It also serves to remind
contracting parties to anticipate potential issues and address them
clearly at the time of contracting to avoid uncertain results in the
courts.
Less than a year later, the Texas Supreme Court released another
opinion in a dispute involving BlueStone’s ability to deduct
purposes of his lease and that as a result of some negligent act or omission on his
part, he proximately caused an injury to the surface owner/lessee’s cattle.”)).
166. 620 S.W.3d 380 (2021).
167. See William D. Farrar, Survey of Selected 2019 Texas Oil and Gas Cases
and Statutes, 6 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 343, 345–47 (2020) (discussing the court of
appeals holding in BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC v. Randle, 601 S.W.3d 848 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 620 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. 2021)).
168. BlueStone, 620 S.W.3d at 384.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. LP v. Tex. Crude Energy, LLC, 573 S.W.3d
198, 211 (Tex. 2019).
172. BlueStone, 620 S.W.3d at 387.
173. Id. at 393.
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postproduction costs from a royalty payment.174 This time, the dispute
centered on the meaning of “the pipeline.”175 The relevant deed conveyed a royalty “to be delivered . . . free of cost in the pipe line, if any,
otherwise free of cost at the mouth of the well or mine.”176 The court
of appeals had referenced the Burlington holding, construing Burlington as establishing a rule that delivery “into the pipeline” always indicates a valuation point at the well.177 The Texas Supreme Court agreed
with this conclusion but clarified that the Burlington holding is narrower than the court of appeals had assumed.178
The correct interpretation of “into the pipeline” or similar phrases
depends on the parties’ intent, as ascertained “from the language they
used to express their agreement.”179 Here, the parties disputed whether
“the pipeline” meant the onsite gathering system or the distribution
pipeline at the point of sale (offsite).180 The lessor argued in favor of
the distribution pipeline interpretation in order to avoid paying transportation costs up to that point.181 However, the Court found that the
term “pipeline” is commonly used in the industry for onsite gathering
systems.182 Also, the provision of an alternate location that is at or near
the wellhead in the absence of a “pipeline” confirms that the parties
intended a valuation point at or near the wellhead.183 Based on this
analysis, the Court construed the term “pipeline” as the onsite gathering system, allowing BlueStone to deduct postproduction costs.184
The court reiterated that “the decisive factor in each [contractconstruction] case is the language chosen by the parties to express their
agreement,” adding, “[j]ust as in Burlington Resources, our analysis
here turns not on an immutable construct but on the parties’ chosen
language.”185

174. Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC, 639 S.W.3d 682,
684 (Tex. 2022).
175. See id.
176. Id. at 685–86.
177. See id. at 685, 688.
178. Id. at 689.
179. Id. at 685.
180. Id. at 686.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 691.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 696.
185. Id.
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XII. 2021 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
A. HB 4218: Vetoed for Contractual Freedom
HB 4218 would have created a statutory cause of action for bad
faith washout of an overriding royalty interest.186 The Texas Legislature passed this bill unanimously with a 148-0 vote in the House and
a 31-0 vote in the Senate.187 However, Governor Abbott vetoed the
bill on the grounds that it would contravene core principles of freedom
to contract and Texans’ right to have their bargains enforced.188 “Instead of enriching lawyers through costly litigation on the back end,”
the governor stated, “Texas law should encourage the parties to negotiate wash out protections in advance.”189
B. SB 1259: A Win for Production Companies, a Loss for Royalty
Owners
SB 1259 added a provision to protect production companies that
withhold royalty payments due to competing claims of ownership by
barring royalty owners from bringing common law causes of action
for breach of contract.190 The Texas Natural Resources Code (the
“Code”) allows companies to withhold royalty payments due to title
disputes affecting distribution of payments and other circumstances
that call into question the contractual payee’s right to receive the royalties.191 However, in 2018, the Texas Supreme Court held that the
statute did not protect companies who suspended royalties in compliance with the Code from a breach of contract cause of action.192 In
response, the Texas Legislature passed SB 1259, which adds to the
statute: “A payee does not have a common law cause of action for
breach of contract against a payor for withholding payments under
Subsection (b) unless, for a dispute concerning the title, the contract
requiring payment specifies otherwise.”193

186. Tex. H.B. 4218, 87th Leg., R.S. (2021).
187. H.J. of Tex., 87th Leg., R.S. 1345 (2021); S.J. of Tex., 87th Leg., R.S. 2287
(2021).
188. Veto Message of Gov. Abbott, Tex. H.B. 4218, 87th Leg., R.S. (2021).
189. Id.
190. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(b).
191. Id.
192. Sen. Comm. on Nat. Res. & Econ. Dev., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1259, 87th
Leg., R.S. (2021); ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 547 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. 2018).
193. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(b-1).
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C. SB 1258: Rolling Back State Land Lessee Duties
SB 1258 revised the statutory requirement for state land lessees
to either drill an offset well or pay a compensatory royalty when oil or
gas is being produced in commercial quantities from a nearby well.194
State land lessees no longer have a duty to drill an offset well based
on a nearby horizontal drainhole well located in an unconventional
fracture treated field unless the well is within 330 feet of the state land
or is closer than the minimum distance established by the Railroad
Commission’s lease-line spacing requirement.195 However, this
amendment does not alter lessees’ duty to drill an offset well for conventional oil and gas development.196 This amendment to the statute
applies only to leases entered into on or after September 1, 2021.197
However, parties to prior leases may contractually agree to avoid a
duty to drill an offset well that this legislation eliminated.198
D. HB 3794: First-Priority Oil & Gas Liens to Protect Texans’
Security Interests
HB 3794 replaces the Texas Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”)
first purchaser statute for oil and gas security interests with a firstpriority oil and gas lien on the basis of real property interests. The
newly-created Chapter 67 of the Texas Property Code now governs oil
and gas liens.199 Each interest owner has an oil and gas lien to the extent of the interest owner’s interest in oil and gas rights.200 The oil and
gas lien is perfected automatically; the interest owner does not need to
file a financing statement or any other type of documentation.201 An
oil and gas lien takes priority over any other lien except for a permitted
lien.202 The Texas Legislature passed this bill in response to a recent
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in which the court refused to
give a Texas, gas interest owner priority in a bankruptcy dispute because of Texas’ nonstandard UCC provisions.203
194. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 52.034(a-1).
195. Id. at (a-1)–(a-2).
196. See id.
197. Sen. Comm. on Nat. Res. & Econ. Dev., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1258, 87th
Leg., R.S. (2021).
198. Id.
199. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 67.
200. § 67.002.
201. § 67.004.
202. § 67.007.
203. Sen. Comm. on Nat. Res. & Econ. Dev., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3794, 87th
Leg., R.S. (2021); In re First River Energy, LLC, 986 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 2021).

